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ABSTRACT 
     In the Windsor-Detroit borderland, the period between 1900 and 1933 was 
characterized by the nation-state’s increasing legislative ability to enact 
interventionist measures to produce a regulated border. While the criminalization 
of alcohol in 1916 and 1920 by both the Canadian and U.S. governments 
respectively, enabled policy-makers to establish a transnational boundary, its 
implementation resulted in the production of legal asymmetries which forced the 
expansion and integration of the illicit economy into legitimate society through 
organizational actors and their respective enterprises.  
     Employing Chris M. Smith and Andrew V. Papachristos concept of multiplex 
ties in criminal organizations in conjunction with Willem van Schendel’s theory of 
illicit flows in borderlands, the paper seeks to reconstruct Harry Low’s Windsor-
based organized crime network to determine how his syndicate employed 
multiplexity as an operational mechanism to circumvent the newly defined 
legislative boundaries between licit and illicit to make products flow during 
prohibition. By analyzing how the growth of organized crime was imbricated in 
the state process to control the flow of goods and people in the borderland; 
therefore, undermines the presentation of the Windsor-Detroit border as a static 
reciprocal relationship in which the illicit economy operated during the first third 
of the 20th century. 
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CHAPTER ONE: 
AN ODE TO PROHIBITION 
 
     Prior to the 20th century the weakest point of a nation-state was its border and 
surrounding region where the continued interaction and shared culture of different 
populations defined a given geographic space. However, by the turn of the century 
borders and broader borderlands were increasingly defined by their territorial proximity 
to neighbouring nation-state(s).1 As a borderland, Windsor-Detroit demonstrates how 
states exerted increasing legislative control along their respective peripheries.2 Between 
1900 and 1933 the Canadian and United States governments enacted legislation which 
sought to define and regulate the movement of people and goods in the region. The legal 
asymmetries produced from competing legislation forced the expansion and integration 
of the region’s illicit economy into legitimate society. Entrenched in Windsor-Detroit’s 
cross-border culture, its infiltration is best illustrated in the movement of alcohol across 
the border following the onset of the United States prohibition in 1919.3 Older 
historiography has emphasized the impact government legislation had on the product 
using a binary lens; therefore, omitting how its criminalization forced the integration of 
regional organized crime into legitimate society by participants and their respective 
enterprises. 
     Previous studies have employed a binary lens to analyze the manufacture, 
wholesaling, and transportation of alcohol across the Windsor-Detroit border during 
 
1 Sarah Maza, Thinking About History (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2017), 8, 66-68. 
2 Brandon Dimmel, “Sabotage, Security, and Border-Crossing Culture: The Detroit River during the First 
World War, 1914-1918,” Histoire sociale/Social History 47, no. 94 (June 2014): 405. 
3 Holly M. Karibo, Sin City North: Sex, Drugs, and Citizenship in the Detroit-Windsor Borderland (Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2015), 16-17.  
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prohibition. Daniel Okrent’s seminal work Last Call: The Rise and Fall of Prohibition 
characterizes its application, arguing that “[f]or Windsor which now seemed welded to 
Detroit by the same river that had previously been a dividing line, [p]rohibition was the 
equivalent of a land rush.”4 While correct to describe prohibition as “a land rush,” his 
portrayal of the Windsor-Detroit border prior to 1920 as “a dividing line,” is not only 
misinformed, but dangerous.5 Invoking the present conception of a border as an 
imaginary line which separates two or more countries first constructs a false assumption 
reliant on the implied ability of the nation-state to control illicit flows prior to prohibition. 
Second, it reduces the border to a static reciprocal relationship.6 Consequently, Okrent’s 
work, like the broader research it represents, restricts a nuanced analysis of the 
relationship between the implementation of interventionist state legislation and the 
movement of illegal products across a borderland. 
     Exemptions include historians Robert Rockaway, Larry Engelmann, and Holly 
Karibo. Their research addresses Detroit’s immigrant-based organized crime networks, 
the relationship between Canadian exporters and American combines, and the expansion 
of the region’s early and mid-century illicit economy into legitimate society respectively.7 
However, they do not examine the relationship between the integration of organized 
crime into legitimate society and the increasing legislative capacity of the nation-state. 
 
4 Daniel Okrent, Last Call: The Rise and Fall of Prohibition (New York: Simon & Schuster, Inc., 2010), 153.  
5 Daniel Okrent, Last Call: The Rise and Fall of Prohibition, 153.  
6 Donna L. Lybecker, Mark K. McBeth, Adam M. Brewer, and Carine De Sy, “The Social Construction of a 
Border: The US-Canada Border,” Journal of Borderlands Studies 33, no. 4 (2018): 529. I am referencing 
their use of the Merriam-Webster definition of ‘border.’  
7 Larry Engelmann, Intemperance: The Lost War Against Liquor (New York: Free Press, 1979), 145.; Holly 
M. Karibo, Sin City North: Sex, Drugs, and Citizenship in the Detroit-Windsor Borderland, 5.; Robert A. 
Rockaway, “The Notorious Purple Gang: Detroit’s All-Jewish Prohibition Era Mob,” Shofar 20, no. 1, 
Special Issue: American Jews (Fall 2001): 113. 
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For that reason, oral testimony from the 1926-1927 Royal Commission of Customs and 
Excise, alongside court transcripts from local, regional, and inter-state newspapers were 
chosen to reconstruct Harry Low’s organized crime network. By analyzing how his 
syndicate used its operational mechanisms to circumvent prohibition legislation to make 
products flow it is possible to see how this undermines the presentation of the Windsor-
Detroit border (1900-1933) as a static reciprocal relationship in which the illicit economy 
operated.8  
    Employing Chris M. Smith and Andrew V. Papachristos’ concept of multiplex ties in 
criminal organizations, in conjunction with Willem van Schendel’s theory of illicit flows 
in borderlands, the research posits that between 1920-1928 Harry Low employed both 
multiplex relationships and legal asymmetries produced by interventionist state 
legislation to create and maintain his Windsor-based liquor and beer network. Using 
familial and business relationships to buy out the Old Carling Brewing Company in 1923, 
Low implemented deviant business practices within the company’s vertical structure to 
circumvent interventionist legislation. Growing in tandem with his operations, these 
practices were adopted alongside local, regional, and transnational multiplex 
relationships to create and integrate a variety of semi- and illicit enterprises into 
legitimate society. Fostering cooperation and coordination between elite participants 
within his network, Low’s companies strategically navigated between legal and illegal 
with intent and regularity.9 By so doing, they minimized associated risks and maximized 
 
8 Willem Van Schendel, “Spaces of Engagement: How Borderlands, Illicit Flows, and Territorial States 
Interlock,” in Illicit Flows and Criminal Things: States, Borders, and the Other Side of Globalization, ed. 
Willem van Schendel and Itty Abraham (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005), 47. 
9 Mark H. Haller, “Bootleggers as Businessmen: From City Slums to City Builders,” in Crime & Justice In 
American History: Historical Articles on the Origins and Evolution of American Criminal Justice 8. 
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profits in Windsor-Detroit’s competitive decentralized market through mutually 
beneficial co-offending business practices.10 Low’s decline coincided with the Canadian 
government’s successful attempt to take control of the country’s liquor and beer industry 
under the 1926-1927 Royal Commission of Customs and Excise. Prosecutors used 
multiplexity against elite participants to dismantle their criminal networks. Therefore, de-
legitimizing organized crime in the Windsor-Detroit borderland as a licit business 
practice is indicative of the growing state process to curtail transnational flows in the 
region. 
ORGANIZED CRIME AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
     During the 19th century organized crime in North America operated at the fringes of 
society with minimal publicity and was geographically restricted to individual 
neighbourhoods.11 However, the onset of both Canadian and U.S. prohibition re-shaped 
criminal networks. Previously small-scale operations were forced to integrate into 
legitimate society through organizational actors and their respective enterprises to reach 
 
Prostitution, Drugs, Gambling and Organized Crime Part 1, ed. Eric H. Monkkonen (Los Angeles: University 
of California, 1992), 309.; Chris M. Smith and Andrew V. Papachristos, “Trust Thy Crooked Neighbor: 
Multiplexity in Chicago Organized Crime Networks,” American Sociological Review 81, no. 4 (August 
2016): 649, 662. 
10 Patricia Adler, Wheeling and Dealing: An Ethnography of an Upper-Level Drug Dealing and Smuggling 
Community (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985), 80.; Mark H. Haller, “Bootleggers as 
Businessmen: From City Slums to City Builders,” 309.; Aili Malm, Gisela Bichler, and Rebecca Nash, “Co-
offending between criminal enterprise groups,” Global Crime 12, no. 2 (May 2011): 113. 
11 J.C. Burnham, “New Perspectives on the Prohibition ‘Experiment’ of the 1920’s,” in Crime & Justice In 
American History: Historical Articles on the Origins and Evolution of American Criminal Justice 8. 
Prostitution, Drugs, Gambling and Organized Crime Part 1, ed. Eric H. Monkkonen (Los Angeles: University 
of California 1992), 107.; Michael Woodiwiss, “Transnational Organized Crime: The Strange Career of an 
American Concept,” in Critical Reflections on Transnational Organized Crime, Money Laundering, and 
Corruption, ed. Margaret E. Beare (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2003), 7-8. 
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and maintain a stable supply of alcohol to regional, national, transnational, and 
international markets.12   
     Encouraged by the financial opportunities afforded from the production of legal 
asymmetries found in Temperance, Volstead, and later legislation, Canadian participants 
developed or bought out failing or closed breweries and distilleries. These companies 
were “the first corporations to be[come] vertically integrated, handling all aspects of their 
trade including production, distribution, sales, export, financing, and marketing.”13 
However, they were the most corrupt enterprises to operate during the early 20th century. 
Using their company’s vertical structure, executives implemented and actively 
participated in organizational or white-collar crime. A “subset of organized crime,” 
organizational crime refers to the planned “crimes [committed] by corporations during 
the course of business,” for corporate or personal gain.14 Deviant business practices such 
as commercial bribery, obstruction of justice, and misconduct were first adopted within 
their vertical structure and carried over to semi-licit and illicit import and export 
companies where they took on new meaning within the decentralized market. Like their 
legitimate companies, smuggling operations required extensive planning to reach 
consumers. However, to secure product safety and transportation to the point of dispersal, 
 
12 Haller, “Bootleggers as Businessmen,” 296.; R.T. Naylor, “Predators, Parasites, or Free-Market Pioneers: 
Reflections on the Nature and Analysis of Profit-Driven Crime,” in Critical Reflections on Transnational 
Organized Crime, Money Laundering, and Corruption, ed. Margaret E. Beare (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 2003), 40-41. 
13 Stephen Schneider, Iced: The Story of Organized Crime in Canada (Mississauga: John Wiley & Sons, 
2009), 197. 
14 Jay S. Albanese, Organized Crime in America, Third Edition (Cincinnati: Anderson Publishing Co., 1996), 
4.; Jay S. Albanese, Ph.D., Organizational Offenders: Understanding Corporate Crime, Second Edition 
(Niagara Falls, New York: Apocalypse Publishing Co., 1988), 7.; F.N. Baldwin, “Racketeer Influenced and 
Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) and the mafia must now welcome organizational crime,” Journal of 
Financial Crime 17 no. 4 (2010): 405.; Stephen Schneider, Iced: The Story of Organized Crime in Canada, 
197. 
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their operations were organized on a horizontal structure in which participants were 
required to form and maintain multiplex relationships with legitimate actors and people 
of questionable or criminal background.15 
     The social network theory of multiplexity occurs when an individual takes on more 
than one role in a familial, social or business network.16 For example, they could be an 
employee, neighbour, or husband who interacts with “particular sets of people who share 
with [them] a particular activity or interest.”17 The same person can take on another 
position. They may also be known as an individual’s sibling, act as a fellow employee, or 
belong to the same athletic association. These ties provide the foundation for obligation, 
reciprocity, and trust in which information, influence, and resources flow between two or 
more individuals. It is within this lens that networks can overlap regardless of apparent 
differences.18 While rare, multiplex ties are structurally relevant, forming the backbone 
among elite participants in criminal networks.19  
     In “Trust Thy Crooked Neighbor: Multiplexity in Chicago Organized Crime 
Networks,” Chris M. Smith and Andrew V. Papachristos determine that success in the 
illicit economy during prohibition required individuals to trust others as a means to 
succeed in operating illicit and licit investments. Used to facilitate partnerships, 
multiplexity mattered most when individuals and their respective business(es) operated 
 
15 Jay S. Albanese, Organized Crime in America, Third Edition, 99.; Jay S. Albanese, Ph.D., Organizational 
Offenders: Understanding Corporate Crime, Second Edition, 7-9.; Schneider, Iced, 197. 
16 Jeremy Boissevain, Friends of Friends: Networks, Manipulators and Coalitions (Great Britain: Western 
Printing Services Ltd., 1974), 24-25, 28. 
17 Jeremy Boissevain, Friends of Friends: Networks, Manipulators and Coalitions, 28.  
18 Boissevain, Friends of Friends, 29.; Chris M. Smith and Andrew V. Papachristos, “Trust Thy Crooked 
Neighbor: Multiplexity in Chicago Organized Crime Networks,”646.  
19 Smith and Papachristos, “Trust Thy Crooked Neighbor,” 646, 662-663. 
 7 
 
outside vertical structures which provided procedure, coordination, reliability, and 
regulation in a legitimate business.20 Their smuggling ventures functioned as complex 
networks at the interstices between legitimate and illicit through multiplex relationships, 
and were built along a horizontal structure in which cooperation and coordination 
between ties outweighed the efficiency found in legitimate enterprises.21  
     As formally independent bootleggers became horizontally organized, they created 
inter-provincial, transnational, and international networks which relied on co-offending 
business practices to operate. These practices required two or more individuals and their 
respective enterprises - regardless if they were legitimate, semi-licit, or illicit - to work 
together employing illegal methods and included predatory pricing practices, bribery, 
fraud, tax evasion, and money laundering.22 Therefore, their ability to exert influence in a 
market depended on the active involvement of employees, mediators, related professions, 
legal institutions such as banks or any person or external company which received or 
supplemented income from criminal activities.23 To maintain supply and demand, 
bootleggers formed a complex web of familial, business, and criminal ties extending 
across Canada, in which elite participants integrated organized crime into legitimate 
society through multiplex ties at each point in the supply chain to create a semi-stable 
 
20 Smith and Papachristos, “Trust Thy Crooked Neighbor,” 663. 
21 Smith and Papachristos, “Trust Thy Crooked Neighbor,” 663, 645. 
22 Aili Malm, Gisela Bichler, and Rebecca Nash, “Co-offending between criminal enterprise groups,” 117.; 
Smith and Papachristos, “Trust Thy Crooked Neighbor,” 645, 663. 
23 “$30,000 Is Ransom of 2 Brothers,” The Border Cities Star, January 15th, 1930. According to The Border 
Cities Star article, mediators used by brewers and distillers included public officials and police officers, 
while related professions pertained to label and glass bottle makers.; Mark H. Haller, “Organized Crime in 
Urban Society: Chicago in the Twentieth Century,” in Crime & Justice In American History: Historical 
Articles on the Origins and Evolution of American Criminal Justice 8. Prostitution, Drugs, Gambling and 
Organized Crime Part 1, ed. Eric H. Monkkonen (Los Angeles: University of California 1992), 354-357.  
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liquor market.24 Windsor-Detroit demonstrates how multiplexity visibly overlapped in a 
borderland during prohibition.   
     Willem van Schendel’s “Spaces of Engagement: How Borderlands, Illicit Flows, and 
Territorial States Interlock,” describes “a borderland as a zone or region which lies an 
international border, and a borderland society as a social and cultural system straddling 
that border.”25 Addressed as a single “unit of analysis,” borderlands offer historians the 
ability to visibly analyze the power configurations required to make illicit goods flow by 
providing access to the site(s) of origin, manufacture, transportation, and consumption.26 
Examining multiplexity as an operational mechanism in Harry Low’s organized crime 
network offers a window onto the relationship between interventionist legislation, illegal 
flows, inter-provincial, and transborder arrangements in one of the country’s largest 
liquor warehousing and distribution centres.27 
     Between 1900 and 1933, the Great Lakes region of southwestern Ontario and 
southeastern Michigan was defined by Canadian and American nation-building with the 
integration and expansion of a transnational north-south economy.28 As the primary 
industrial centre along the United States and Canadian border prior to the Second World 
 
24 Smith and Papachristos, “Trust Thy Crooked Neighbor,” 645, 662-663. 
25 Willem van Schendel, “Spaces of Engagement: How Borderlands, Illicit Flows, and Territorial States 
Interlock,” 44. 
26 Itty Abraham and Willem van Schendel, “Introduction: The Making of Illicitness,” in Illicit Flows and 
Criminal Things: States, Borders, and the Other Side of Globalization, ed. Itty Abraham and Willem van 
Schendel (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005), 9.; Schendel, “Spaces of Engagement,” 47-48-49. 
27 Schendel, “Spaces of Engagement,” 62. 
28 David R. Smith, “Structuring the Permeable Border: Channeling and Regulating Cross-Border Traffic in 
Labor, Capital, and Goods,” in Permeable Border: The Great Lakes Basin as Transnational Region, 1650-
1990, ed. John Bukoczyk, Nora Faires, David R. Smith, and Randy William Widdis (Pittsburgh: University of 
Pittsburgh Press, 2005), 120. 
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War, commuters, immigrants, and tourists regularly moved between the countries.29 
However, both governments utilized their growing state powers to implement 
interventionist legislation meant to regulate the increasing transportation of goods, 
services, and individuals. Despite legislative efforts, the border remained porous to white 
Americans and Canadians.30 
     During this period, the illicit economy grew in tandem with the region and was visible 
through Windsor-Detroit’s “wide-open nature,” in which drugs, gambling, and 
prostitution dominated transnational flows.31 Entrenched in the region since the 17th 
century as a source of income for residents, vice related activities came under increasing 
scrutiny during the mid-19th century by religious authorities and later politicians with 
moral-reformist backgrounds in the United States and Canada. Facilitating religious 
terminology, moral-reformists sought “to curb what they saw as a moral decline,” in the 
working class by “convinc[ing] followers that society’s ills could be cured in a world 
without drink.”32 As a form of social change, the shift toward collective prohibition was 
influenced by the implementation of secular temperance legislation during the later 19th 
century. 
 
29 Karibo, Sin City North, 16-17.; Paul-Matthias Tyrell, “Utilizing a Border as a Local Economic Resource: 
The Example of the Prohibition-Era Detroit-Windsor Borderland,” Comparative American Studies An 
International Journal 13, no. 1-2 (2015): 17. 
30 Brandon Dimmel, “Sabotage, Security, and Border-Crossing Culture: The Detroit River during the First 
World War, 1914-1918,” 404.; Karibo, Sin City North, 16-17.; David R. Smith, “Structuring the Permeable 
Border: Channeling and Regulating Cross-Border Traffic in Labor, Capital, and Goods,” 121. 
31 Karibo, Sin City North, 5, 27. 
32 Karibo, Sin City North, 26.; Edgar-André Montigny, The Real Dope: Social, Legal, and Historical 
Perspectives on the Regulation of Drugs in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2011), 6.; 
Stephen T. Moore, “Defining the ‘Undefended,’: Canadians, Americans, and the Multiple Meanings of 
Border,” The American Review of Canadian Studies 34 no. 1 (Spring 2004): 3. 
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     Both Ontario and Michigan experimented with federal and local forms of 
prohibition.33 In Ontario, this included the federally mandated 1878 Canada Temperance 
Act (or The Scott Act) while in Michigan individual counties “adopted ‘dry’ 
ordinances.”34 These attempts to regulate social behaviour were hindered by the inability 
of both provincial and state governments to implement legislation along national, 
provincial, and inter-state borders.35 As a result, the Windsor-Detroit region did not 
experience an influx in the movement of alcohol until the end of the First World War 
when Canada and the United States implemented temperance legislation at each level of 
government using interventionist measures.36  
     In Canada these measures included the War Measures Act (1914) and in Ontario, the 
Ontario Temperance Act (1916) while in the United States Congress passed the 
Eighteenth Amendment (1919) and later the Volstead Act (1920). By “prohibiting the 
manufacture, sale, and consumption of alcoholic beverages” these interventionist 
measures reflect the shift from informal temperance to state sanctioned prohibition.37 The 
ability of the nation-state to produce and implement legislation which criminalized the 
consumption and transportation of alcohol, demonstrates their increasing bureaucratic 
capacity to enact wide-reaching laws through local, regional, and federal agencies.38 
 
33 Philip Mason, Rumrunning and the Roaring Twenties: Prohibition on the Michigan-Ontario Waterway 
(Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1995), 13. 
34 Philip Mason, Rumrunning and the Roaring Twenties, 13.  
35 Dan Malleck, “An Innovation from Across the Line: The American Drinker and Liquor Regulation in Two 
Ontario Border Communities, 1927-1944,” Journal of Canadian Studies 41, no. 1 (2008): 154. 
36 Mason, Rumrunning and the Roaring Twenties, 13. According to Mason, the region did not experience 
an influx because Ohio did not adopt similar legislation. 
37 Mason, Rumrunning and the Roaring Twenties, 13. 
38 F.L. Barron, “The American Origins of the Temperance Movement in Ontario, 1828-1850,” The Canadian 
Review of American Studies 11, no. 2 (Fall 1980): 140.; Greg Marquis, “‘Brewers and Distillers Paradise’: 
American Views of Canadian Alcohol Policies, 1919 to 1935,” Canadian Review of American Studies 34, no. 
2 (2004): 138. 
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However, enforcement was legislatively impeded in Canada through the division of 
federal and provincial law.  
     In opposition to the United States which enforced prohibition at the national level, its 
implementation in Canada was curtailed by the Canadian constitution which defined 
provincial and federal jurisdictions.39 Following the end of the War Measures Act on 
January 1st, 1920, the Canadian federal government “passed legislation authorizing each 
province to decide if [p]rohibition would continue.”40 Excluding Quebec, all provincial 
governments passed laws which banned the purchasing of alcohol. The effectiveness of 
prohibition was further challenged by the federal government which later approved 
legislation legalizing the production of alcohol for export in all provinces.41 Because 
Ontario provincial legislation only banned the purchasing and/or consumption of alcohol, 
there were no laws governing the “production, import[ation], and export[ation] [of 
alcohol] to or from another province or a foreign country because these rights rested with 
the federal government.”42 It is within this lens that early exporters like Harry Low took 
advantage of provincial and federal legal asymmetries. 
     Born March 17th, 1888, to Frank and Sarah Ann Low of 127 George Street, ByWard 
Market, Bytown, present-day Ottawa, Harry was the first of their five children and was 
raised in the working-class neighbourhood. An urban centre where the lack of social 
mobility and vice visibly intersected, Low was exposed from a young age to the 
 
39 Okrent, Last Call, 146. 
40 Mason, Rumrunning and the Roaring Twenties, 37. 
41 Mason, Rumrunning and the Roaring Twenties, 37. 
42 Paul-Matthias Tyrell, “Utilizing a Border as a Local Economic Resource: The Example of the Prohibition-
Era Detroit-Windsor Borderland,” 19. 
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underbelly of ByWard Market that in turn shaped his own need for familial and business 
mobility as is demonstrated in his education, marriage, and business acquisitions.43  
     During the late 19th century, there were three paths for persons from working-class 
neighbourhoods or inner-city slums to pursue. The majority received minimal education 
and upon entering the workforce joined shops, factories or menial service where mobility 
was incremental. A second, albeit smaller group sought professional employment 
following college, while the third joined organized crime.44 Like his contemporaries, Low 
fell into the third category. Growing up he received minimal formal schooling and was 
trained as a teenager in tool and die by his father, a machinist who operated his own 
business. Following his apprenticeship Low pursued the trade working at his father’s 
shop.45 In 1908, he married Norah Ellen Morgan who bore two children, Norah Ellen and 
Frank Gordon in 1910 and 1916 respectively. The family lived in ByWard Market until 
their move in 1911 from their 347 Dalhousie Street apartment to 72 Dufferin Road in the 
fashionable district of New Edinburgh, located across from the Governor General’s 
Rideau Hall residence.46 This abrupt change in the family’s lack of social mobility was 
the result of a lucrative business acquisition.  
     Between their move in 1911 and 1915 Low purchased 299 Bank Street’s St. George’s 
Theatre and quit working in tool and die. Described as an ambitious and innovative 
entrepreneur, Low not only featured an outdoor screen to show silent films to passersby, 
but regularly rented out the theatre for lectures and gatherings. Alongside his legitimate 
 
43 Mark H. Haller, “Organized Crime in Urban Society: Chicago in the Twentieth Century,” 341-342.; Gary 
May, Two Men and Their Monster (Windsor: Your Story Publishing, 2015), 23. 
44 Haller, “Organized Crime in Urban Society,” 342. 
45 Gary May, Two Men and Their Monster, 23-24. 
46 May, Two Men and Their Monster, 23-25. 
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business, he ran a lucrative side venture buying and fattening horses for profit.47 While it 
cannot be determined that Low actively engaged in organized crime as a member of the 
entertainment industry, because of his need to further the social and economic positions 
of his family and business(es), it cannot be ruled out that during his ownership of St. 
George’s Theatre he at minimum participated in deviant business practices. This is 
because Low’s earliest investments illustrate how he managed enterprises over his 
lifetime as illustrated in his move to and acquisitions made in Windsor.48   
     Spurred by the financial opportunities offered by the Windsor-Detroit region, Low 
moved his family to Sandwich, Ontario (today a neighbourhood of Windsor) in 1919 
where he briefly resumed working as a tool and die maker in Detroit. From the Low’s 
arrival in Windsor to their 1923 acquisition of 262 Devonshire Road the family lived at 
several residences including 220 Askin Boulevard and on Caron Avenue.49 Following his 
early business patterns, between 1919 and 1920 Low opened a licit pool hall at 100 
Sandwich Street West. Older than other early bootleggers and an experienced 
businessman, he used a $300 loan to create an illegal side venture in the form of a 
gambling room and blind pig at the back of his enterprise.50 A popular semi-licit 
establishment among American tourists and locals, Low’s success encouraged his 
siblings, notably his brother Samuel James and parents Frank and Sarah Ann, to move to 
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50 May, Two Men and Their Monster, 28. 
 14 
 
Sandwich by 1922. Following the onset of U.S. prohibition in 1920, Low expanded his 
semi-licit operations entering the chaotic liquor market as a mid-level purchaser.51  
     In 1920, he established one of the first export warehouses for liquor in LaSalle (near 
Windsor) where he worked as an independent purchaser, buying from various Montreal 
brands including Bovin and Wilson, Lawrence Wilson, and Martel Goods.52 While Low 
was an experienced businessman, specializing in importation facilitated the initial growth 
of his network by influencing the type(s) of people and their respective enterprise(s) that 
he maintained relationships with.53 Notably, his venture shifted preferred business ties 
from familial to social and functional local and inter-provincial partnerships. As an 
independent, Low’s early activities were horizontally structured and operated on a limited 
scale. However, it offered the time needed to acquire new skills such as organizing 
transactions and coordinating the transportation of goods which were necessary to 
compete with other local purchasers and vertically structured companies.54 During the 
first year of U.S. prohibition, most of the region’s import and export companies operated 
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independently of large-scale brewers and distillers; however, both used the region’s 
geography to access Detroit’s illicit market.55  
     A competitive decentralized regional and transnational market, Windsor-Detroit 
“could absorb not just vast quantities of liquor but also a large variety of types: beer, 
scotch, bourbon, gin, wines, [and] champagnes.”56 Unlike the popular depiction of illegal 
markets as hierarchical and monopolistic, Windsor-Detroit was defined by ad hoc 
associations which were subject to market pressures.57 Within the market, early resale 
value for a $1 to $2.50 bottle of Canadian liquor or beer imported and/or purchased in 
Windsor could sell between $10 to $13 (and in some cases $20) in Michigan. These 
inflated prices acted as an insurance and were informally governed by purchasers and 
exporters who based cost on location, transportation or labour expenditures, availability, 
competition, risk, and product reputability.58 Following the introduction of large 
companies such as the British-American and Kuntz Breweries between 1920-1921, 
whose popular and reputable products commanded higher prices, independents were 
forced to cut back on profits to maintain inventories, cash, and product flow.59 However, 
organized crime did not emerge from increasing or inflated prices and regional 
competition, rather these factors were the foundations on which strategic multiplex 
partnerships were later built for the purpose of co-offending to profit in and attempt to 
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control the region’s decentralized market. Instead, syndicates evolved in response to 
favourable legal asymmetries from competing state and local legislation which benefited 
vertically structured Canadian suppliers.60 
     During his tenure as a Michigan federal judge, Arthur J. Tuttle sought to uphold “the 
idea of [p]rohibition and believed deeply in its enforcement.”61 While morally opposed to 
the consumption and transportation of alcohol under the Volstead Act, in August 1921 he 
allowed “bonded rail shipments originating at the Hiram Walker Distillery,” to be 
shipped to their intended destination in Mexico.62 Tuttle “based his decision on his belief 
that under the law the ‘Volstead Act’ or national prohibition law [did] not abrogate the 
treaty of July 4, 1871, between the United States and Great Britain.”63 By ruling in favour 
of the treaty, he established precedence granting a Canadian company a “temporary 
injunction” to transport alcohol across the border intended for a foreign destination.64 
Instead of sparking concern, the ruling produced disinterested views among U.S. customs 
agents.  
     When the legislation passed, Detroit customs collector Richard I. Lawson commented 
to the Detroit Free Press that he “[did not] believe the granting of a [future] permanent 
restraining injunction by Judge Tuttle [would] greatly affect Canadian shipments of 
liquor in bond through the United States for export.”65 At the time the article was 
 
60 Albanese, Organized Crime in America, 99.; Tyrell, “Utilizing a Border as a Local Economic Resource,” 18. 
61 Okrent, Last Call, 151. 
62 Okrent, Last Call, 152. 
63 “$300,000 Booze Bound Via U.S. To Alien Ports: Walker Firm Starts First $10,000 Cargo as Tuttle Grants 
Injunction Distilleries Clogged With Order For Rum District Attorney to Take ‘Hands Off’ Ruling to Supreme 
Court,” Detroit Free Press, August 24th, 1921. 
64 “$300,000 Booze Bound Via U.S. To Alien Ports,” Detroit Free Press. 
65 “$300,000 Booze Bound Via U.S. To Alien Ports,” Detroit Free Press. 
 17 
 
published, neither Tuttle nor customs were concerned with either future rulings in the 
state or cases presented in Windsor that could alter the Michigan federal court’s 
injunction.  
     In Windsor, local police magistrate W.E. Gundy was responsible for producing 
competing legislation which legitimized the exportation of alcohol for any Canadian 
brewery or distillery to the United States using clearance papers or B-13s. In August 
1921, he presided over “a test case, in which A. Raffelay, an American citizen, bought 
100 cases of beer from the British-American Brewing Company.”66 In his ruling, Gundy 
determined “that Canadian officers had no right to stop shipments of liquor destined for 
the United States, or any other point out-side Ontario,” so long as they had clearance 
papers.67 Gundy based his injunction on the way in which Raffelay ordered from the 
brewery. He stated that “[h]ad Raffelay made his order by let-ter from the United States 
the transaction would have been valid.”68 Stipulating that “[c]itizens of the United States 
who want[ed] to purchase liquor from Canadian sources [had to] remain away from 
Ontario during purchase negotiations, if they would avoid conflict with the Ontario 
temperance act.”69 Despite ruling in favour of distilleries and breweries, Gundy’s 
injunction did not overturn preceding federal export legislation.70 
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     Under the federal government, when brewers and distillers sold Canadian 
manufactured products within the country, they were to pay a sales tax of $10, while 
exported goods required a $9 excise tax. The fee was not applied if a receiving customs 
officer provided a landing certificate or B-13 to confirm that a duty paid product was 
exported legitimately to a foreign destination.71 Because alcohol was an illegal product in 
the United States, American customs officers could not produce these certificates. As a 
result, exporters used foreign destinations on clearance papers to circumvent both the 
legislation and tax.72 However, all parties involved were aware that alcohol transported 
across the border was not reaching its stated destination, rather its intended local and 
inter-state markets in Detroit, Michigan, Cleveland, Ohio, Chicago, Illinois, St. Louis, 
Missouri, and New York City, New York.73 The lack of coordination and cooperation 
between the Canadian and American judicial and police process, highlights the 
underlying tension to uphold prohibition by attempting to transfer its enforcement to 
another party.74 Based on the rulings made by Tuttle and Gundy, their respective 
decisions demonstrate the primary legislative way in which the expanding nation-state 
impacted the movement of goods across the border.  
     Increasing legislative control is demonstrated not in their ability to control the volume 
of alcohol moved, but in their attempts to regulate who and where alcohol was being 
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shipped to and is illustrated in the ways the judges reached their rulings. However, 
Gundy’s ruling rendered Canadian customs agents and police officers powerless if 
clearance papers were provided. While in the United States, customs, police, and dry 
agents lacked the numbers needed to stop shipments.75 Of which the legal asymmetries 
and lack of federal, state, and provincial cooperation disproportionately benefitted 
Canadian manufacturers who transported alcohol to the Windsor-Detroit market for 
dispersal to U.S. and Canadian consumers. In turn, vertically structured companies used 
their newfound legitimacy to form strategic alliances to facilitate product flow; thereby, 
pushing out small-time operators between 1921 and 1923.76 The process is illustrated in 
Low’s shift from independent purchaser and exporter to “legitimate” businessman.  
     Low continued to work independently until 1923, when Montreal distilleries formed 
the Montreal Liquor Commission and small-scale liquor warehouses went under. Unable 
to operate his enterprise, Low quit the export business.77 Based on his following two 
business decisions which occurred in the same year, it can be determined he understood 
that Ontario brewers and distillers were becoming organized based on the legal 
asymmetries produced by judges Tuttle and Gundy. However, transitioning to a 
“legitimate” businessman required Low to mobilize familial multiplex relationships and 
invest in a partnership with likeminded individuals to manufacture and export alcohol on 
a large-scale.78  
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     In criminal networks, multiplex relationships are the strongest in familial or ethnic 
groups where trust binds two or more individuals to a common risk-based goal or cause.79 
Harry Low’s network was no exception. Instead of selling the poolhall outright, his father 
Frank was appointed proprietor and his younger brother Samuel James as manager in 
1923.80 By taking on additional roles within Low’s network both his father and brother 
acquired multiplex ties. Mobilizing these ties to maintain his initial business investment, 
Low took his greatest risk extending his assets beyond the Windsor-Detroit borderland to 
purchase the Old Carling Brewing Company.81   
     Located on Waterloo Street in London, Ontario, Carling Brewery was created by 
Thomas Carling in 1843. Passing ownership to his sons John and William in 1850, 
Carling grew to become a profitable family-run enterprise. Following the death of John 
Carling in 1911, the company was passed onto his son Harry. However, the First World 
War and later prohibition crippled production, forcing its closure in 1920.82 
     In October 1923, Low established a formal partnership with Montrealer Marco Leon 
and Londoner Charles Burns to purchase the company.83 Buying out the Carling family, 
Low made the transaction on behalf of Leon and Burns. Organizing the new Carling 
Brewery, the trio became the company’s executives. Of which Low himself acquired the 
positions of Vice President and General Manager. Replacing the machinery with the 
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latest upgrades the re-established brewery produced its first beer for export in April 
1924.84 To establish a supply chain Low, Leon, and Burns leased both the station and 
dock 30 of the Canada Pacific Railway Station at Sandwich Street West and Caron 
Avenue and used it as their main office.85  
     Coinciding with their Windsor investment and first beer production, the trio officially 
consolidated their control in 1924, making the enterprise “a joint stock company, Carling 
Breweries Limited.” 86 Later, they amended the name to Carling Export Brewing and 
Malting Company Limited pronouncing their entry in the export business as Carling 
Export or the Carling Agency.87 However, reaching their intended inter-provincial and 
transnational markets required significant financial risks.88 Between 1923 and 1925 Low 
made key investments to secure product safety and transportation by purchasing multiple 
speedboats as well as two large sea-going vessels, the Vedas and Geronimo, of which the 
company used to ensure their supply chain to move large orders of alcohol out of 
Carling’s dock.89 An urban location which provided rail and water access, the C.P.R. 
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station and dock enabled the company to transport large cargos to Quebec and New 
Brunswick, navigate international waters, and sail to large U.S. cities with port access; 
therefore, cultivating loyal customers of which, Mr. Savard of Detroit, Michigan became 
the brewery’s primary purchaser. 90 
     Like the relationship between the illicit and legitimate economy, American purchasers 
ran parallel and increasingly intersected with Canadian manufacturers and later their 
export ventures as Detroit’s organized crime syndicates consolidated their power along 
the Detroit River between 1923 and 1924.91 Originally operating under the alias “Mr. 
Grandi,” “C.A.” or “F. Savard,” and later “Druzinsky,” this elusive buyer purchased 
alcohol out of Detroit from Carling and its export subsidiaries between 1924 and 1927.92 
Per arrangement, Savard paid for the products before they left Windsor and split the 
profits with Carling fifty-fifty, minus the expenses for shipping until the creation of the 
brewery’s subsidiary Low’s Group in 1925, at which time the agreement was seemingly 
transferred to their export company.93 To expedite products, in 1924 Low began creating 
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separate bank accounts for Savard at the Dominion Bank of Windsor ostensibly with the 
purpose of setting aside money for “wages, trucking, demurrage,” or other incurred 
expenses.94 Because Savard worked at the most dangerous point in the supply chain as 
purchaser, he faced great risk from American authorities for illegally procuring alcohol 
and went to extreme lengths in order to conceal his operations.95  
     Of Savard’s covert practices, he employed John Allen Kennedy as his representative 
to maintain his interests at the C.P.R. dock to circumvent Windsor police magistrate W.E. 
Gundy’s 1921 ruling.96 When he was not representing Savard, Kennedy oversaw 
Carling’s warehouse as manager and worked as a bookkeeper for the brewery.97 
Therefore, each time Savard reinvested in his relationship with Low’s companies, 
Kennedy by extension, acted as a multiplex tie, which connected the American purchaser, 
his subordinates, and distributors to Carling Brewery and later its export subsidiaries. 
Furthermore, as a Carling employee, Kennedy held a secondary multiplex tie, which 
linked the brewery’s vertical and horizontal enterprises to facilitate the movement of 
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alcohol between the points of manufacture and wholesaling. However, to profit in a 
competitive decentralized market required Carling’s executives, employees, and their 
American purchaser(s) to cooperate and coordinate their activities. 
     Based on Low’s partnerships outside the familial network, his alliance with Leon and 
Burns was strategic and binding. By himself, he did not have the financial resources to 
acquire, refurbish, and wait almost six months to establish a stable production line. 
Aligning with similar minded individuals, brought together the political clout, managerial 
skills, and investment capital needed to plan operations and access better markets.98 
Together, they were bound in their self-interest, mutual trust, equality, and shared profit 
in a legitimate enterprise.99 While Carling was a legitimate company, because of Low’s 
previous exposure in operating legitimate, semi- and illicit investments, his transaction to 
buy out the brewery made the acquisition a predatory purchase. Infiltrating a reputable 
business outside the Windsor-Detroit borderland afforded the trio the ability to establish 
themselves as “legitimate” businessmen, authorizing them to conduct ‘illegal’ 
transactions with purchasers like Mr. Savard.100 However, to circumvent interventionist 
legislation to reach Canadian and U.S. buyers and consumers, executives implemented 
manufacturing and trade violations which required employees at each level of the 
enterprise to conspire to commit organizational crime.101   
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     Taking over the site of origin and manufacture, the trio used their company’s vertical 
structure to plan, introduce, and formalize deviant practices in the production, 
wholesaling, and transportation process for their personal gain.102 Carling employees and 
related professions (i.e. glass bottle manufacturers) which held contracts with the 
company became complicit in manufacturing and trade violations. Significantly, 
employees such as John Allen Kennedy who held overlapping roles in both the vertical 
and horizontal structures of Low’s businesses therefore, upheld “routine” business 
methods regularly crossed the spheres of legitimate and illicit.103 Practices initiated 
within the vertical structure were rendered visible in horizontally organized export 
companies created between 1925 and 1927 within the Windsor-Detroit borderland. These 
included: bribery, predatory pricing or price-cutting, undervaluation, price-fixing, fraud, 
money laundering, and tax evasion. Institutionalized under Harry Low and Charles 
Burns, these practices took on new meaning within their network as co-offending 
business practices which cultivated and intersected with multiplex ties to form the 
backbone of their smuggling operations.104 To launch their semi-licit and illicit export 
subsidiaries, Low, Leon, and Burns used their new found “legitimacy” to form external 
partnerships as independent businessmen.105   
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CHAPTER TWO: 
A GOLDEN HOPPORTUNITY 
 
     Acting independently, the trio’s entry in and creation of various enterprises was not 
dictated by Carling’s bureaucratic structure. Rather, the actions taken by individual 
partners were informed by their association in a mutually beneficial enterprise, as well as 
further legislative measures implemented by both the U.S. and Canadian governments in 
their pursuit to curtail illegal transnational flows. One of the first combined attempts to 
take legislative control was the June 6th, 1924 Anti-Smuggling Treaty. Implemented in 
1925, the treaty enforced “regular clearances of all boats, no clearances after six o’clock, 
and no loading or clearances on Sunday. It [further] provided for the notification of 
American officers when boats did clear.”106 By so doing, it became advantageous for 
vertically structured companies to heavily invest in small-scale export ventures for the 
purpose of circumventing legislation to transport their products to intended markets.  
     These export ventures operated on a small-scale having “lower capitalization, fewer 
personnel, and less formal management than comparable legal enterprises,” which 
necessitated coordinating efforts horizontally by forming multiplex partnerships to 
facilitate product flow.107 Through their endeavours, Low, Leon, and Burns worked to 
form, uphold, and reinvest in overlapping strategic partnerships which sought to 
circumvent interventionist legislation for financial gain, product and price control, and 
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market access.108 To avoid government detection, it was necessary to not only 
horizontally organize their supply chains for subsidiary companies by establishing 
interests in other various enterprises through multiplex ties, but to ingratiate products into 
legitimate society by co-offending to conceal their illegal transactions and transportation 
methods. As an operational mechanism, multiplexity generated their network’s structure 
shifting desired partnerships from small ad hoc associations to integrated syndicates 
which relied on horizontal partnerships. However, these alliances were not equal.109 
Individuals who held significant economic, political, or social resources along with the 
capacity to engage in multiple short and long-term partnerships at once were the most 
sought after for their ability to exert influence within a market.110 As previously stated, 
competition and product inflation within the Windsor-Detroit market provided the basis 
in which initial partnerships were formed and reinvested. Therefore, the transition to 
operating a large-scale syndicate which employed multiplexity as an operational 
mechanism to circumvent interventionist legislation relied on Low, Leon, and Burns’ 
ability to produce a horizontally coordinated inter-provincial, and transnational import 
and export network based on price cutting as a co-offending business practice to 
minimize risk and maximize their profits within a decentralized market, and was 
launched with Low and Leon’s reinvestment in their initial partnership in 1925 forming 
Low’s Group.111 
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     Low’s Group (or Low, Leon, and Burns) was initially composed of Harry Low, Marco 
Leon, and Samuel James Low.112 Acting as an independent businessman, Low 
established a multiplex tie with Leon because of their pre-existing partnership and 
strengthened his relationship with his brother Sam. Tying preceding partnerships and 
familial relationships to an alliance afforded the enterprise with the stability and skill sets 
needed to adapt to the 1924 Anti-Smuggling Treaty. By coordinating their business 
activities, Low’s Group co-offended to purchase beer and liquor from local and regional 
breweries and distilleries ostensibly for export, thereby, crossing the spheres of legitimate 
and illicit with intent and regularity.113 However, to exert influence and manipulate the 
regional and transnational market, Low had to expand his network outside the Windsor-
Detroit borderland and more broadly, Ontario. Through his efforts, Low established a 
strategic partnership with Consolidated Exporters of Vancouver which provided access to 
needed resources for the purpose of price-cutting the Windsor-Detroit market.114 
     In April 1925, Low partnered with the Consolidated Exporters of Vancouver or 
C.E.V. which specialized in procuring imported liquors from Europe, as well as local 
brewers and distillers by representing the interests of the following nineteen formerly 
independent export houses: 
The National Exporters Limited 
The Calgary Export Company Limited 
Rithet Consolidated Company, Ltd. 
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Consumers Export Company Limited 
B.C. Liquor Company, Limited 
Dominion Liquor Company, Ltd. 
J.G. Brooks, Limited 
Davis Liquor Company, Limited 
Pither and Leiser Ltd. 
Nat. Bell Wine Company, Ltd. 
Gold Bond Limited 
Lloyd & Son, Limited 
Dominion Trading Co. Ltd. 
The Great West Wine Company, Ltd. 
Brofman’s Limited 
Metropole Liquor Co. Limited 
The Independent Exporters Limited 
The Glasgow Traders Limited 
The Standard Drug and Supply Co. Ltd.115  
 
Within C.E.V.’s immediate network the company held multiple long-term agreements 
with regional brewers, distillers, and other export companies which provided the West 
Coast and prairie provinces with a semi-stable network in which multiple legitimate and 
semi-licit businesses co-offended.116 The addition of Low’s Group to C.E.V.’s network 
presents a mutually beneficial relationship in which Low’s Group gained access to 
international markets, while C.E.V. acquired a reliable connection to the U.S. Midwest 
and East Coast markets via the C.P.R. and C.N. railways to Windsor where products were 
handled by Low’s Group and exported to their Detroit purchaser who in turn moved the 
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products to their intended markets. From their alliance, Low’s Group produced an inter-
provincial network used to price-cut the Windsor-Detroit market. However, to move 
products to their intended markets required Carling’s subsidiary and their American 
buyer to align their respective networks to secure rail transportation.117  
     In July 1925, Low approached Mr. Hawker, a C.P.R. Yardmaster at Windsor, on 
behalf of Savard who requested the switching of railcars to ensure product safety during 
transportation.118 Hawker not only accepted the bribe, but relayed their scheme to the 
Michigan Central Yardmaster Mr. McGowan to have bonded railcars from the Carling 
Brewery be transported to Windsor, where for $100 per car they would “be diverted from 
the Michigan Central yards to the C.P.R. yards, the seals broken, liquor loaded on them, 
and sent on to the United States.”119 Upon discovery, Hawker was immediately fired by 
Horace C. Grout, the General Superintendent of Ontario for the Canadian Pacific 
Railway.120  
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     At first glance, the switching of rail cars seems impossible. To achieve his goal, Low 
would have had to go to the largest U.S. train yard, where heavy commodities were 
shipped and bribe the following individuals:  
     the loading foreman; he would have to bribe the office staff to make false bills; he  
     would have to get in touch with some firm that was using the stamp of the  
     Commission; that is, the stamp of weights, to that the car would not be molested to be  
     weighed. When he got the car into Detroit, he would have to see the Customs officers  
     or somebody, to make sure that they did not open the car as an empty, on account as  
     you can generally tell an empty car from a loaded one by the sound of it on a boat, and  
     when it got on this side, he would have to bribe a certain number of switchmen,  
     Customs officials, clerks in order to put his proposition through.121 
 
However, the related practice of camouflaging rail cars was employed by Carling. Since 
1924, the brewery actively bribed railway employees, used false invoices, and export 
seals identifying their products as canned meat and other goods for the C.P.R, Wabash, 
and C.N.R.122 These illegal practices were orchestrated by executives who used their 
company’s vertical structure to implement deviant practices which were upheld by 
cooperating employees. Leveraging their power and influence, elite participants 
coordinated efforts horizontally conspiring to commit bribery and fraud.123 This 
illustrates how “legitimate” companies moved between the spheres of legal and illegal 
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with intent and regularity for the purpose of minimizing risks for inland transportation to 
major Canadian and U.S. cities.124 
     While his plan backfired, all of Low’s businesses, both vertical and horizontal, 
developed large-scale organized payments to warehouse owners, police, railway 
employees and officials, customs agents and officials, and ferry employees.125 Because 
Windsor (and the Border Cities) was the country’s fastest growing industrial centre, the 
region acted as a hub for Canada and the American Midwest’s major railway lines of 
which the C.P.R., C.N., Michigan Central Railway, Pere Marquette, and the Wabash 
converged in the city.126 Facilitating the movement of alcohol, shipments to the U.S. were 
primarily carried out using rail; however, boat, auto, ferry, and trucking services were 
also used. The horizontal ties used to secure transportation were discrete, yet functional, 
and provided access to favouritism, political support, and money. What they lacked in 
trust, they made up in resources, favours, and new strategies to circumvent legislation for 
companies.127  
     Based on the stipulations established under the June 6th, 1924 Anti-Smuggling Treaty, 
alcohol was legally exportable under Canadian law; however, it was an illegal product in 
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the United States. Bribing officials and fraudulently employing bonded rail cars to mimic 
legal cargo prevented the Canadian government from carrying out due diligence to notify 
the United States of impending liquor shipments.128 While using mimicry to move 
alcohol with or as legal products illustrates the network’s ability to adapt to 
interventionist legislation designed to regulate transborder flows; therefore, conspiring to 
commit bribery, fraud, and mimicry indicate the growing entrenchment of smuggling 
operations within the borderland.129 Finally, Low’s attempt to bribe members of the 
Michigan Central Railway indicates the markets his syndicate intended to reach.130  
     The Michigan Central Railway or M.C.R. was connected to the New York Central 
Railway which was the second-largest railway system in the United States during the 
early 20th century. Stretching over 10,000 miles, it serviced Ontario, Quebec, and 
Montreal, as well as nine U.S. states. Major American cities within the network included 
Detroit, Cleveland, Buffalo, New York, Chicago, Cincinnati, St. Louis, and Boston.131 As 
some of the most lucrative urban centres for Canadian exporters, Low was willing to 
procure U.S. Customs seals at any cost and if he could not bribe his way through the 
M.C.R. he would allegedly attempt to do so at other junctions such as Bridgeburg and St. 
Thomas.132 Demonstrated in Carling’s later shipments, the company successfully 
switched and camouflaged their products using tracks at Windsor or Walkerville and 
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along other railways such as the Wabash to infiltrate other Ontario junctions including St. 
Thomas and Port Stanley, for the purpose of shipping products east of Buffalo, Ohio. Of 
these known shipments, products were listed as canned goods, milk, scrap paper, and 
sugar. One was consigned by F. Savard, another by Samuel Low in Savard’s name, and 
the last was receipted by Low himself.133 Significantly, the car which contained Low’s 
signature was loaded with Carling beer, camouflaged as “sugar for Niagara Falls, N.Y., 
[and] sealed with American and Canadian Customs seals on a through waybill.”134 With 
secure rail transportation, Low’s Group and C.E.V. reinvested their partnership one year 
later to allocate more resources to price-cut Southwestern Ontario. 
     On April 3rd 1926, Low and Leon travelled to Vancouver to sign exclusive agency for 
C.E.V. products in Ontario at the Vancouver Sittings. Based on the agreement, they were 
to sell a certain amount per month and products were to be handled by Low’s Group for 
export to their Detroit purchaser.135 Renewing their alliance produced a multiplex tie 
which strengthened the trust and reciprocity between the two companies and in turn was 
used to enforce greater coordination for the purpose of co-offending to price-cut and take 
control of the Windsor-Detroit market. As opposed to their 1925 agreement which 
benefitted both parties, Low’s Group leveraged their multiplex structure to enlarge their 
position as a growing regional and inter-provincial network.136 
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     In the agreement Low’s Group included Charles Burns as an independent partner 
despite the appearance of minimal involvement in the export industry. Like Low, Leon, 
and Burns’ initial partnership to acquire Carling, by tying trust to a high-risk enterprise, 
Charles Burns was obligated to uphold company operations in the interest of Low’s 
Group as demonstrated in their profit’s distribution. Divided in a four-way split, Low, 
Leon, and Burns acted as equal partners and received the same shares, while Samuel Low 
received a smaller portion of the earnings because he was interested exclusively in 
imported liquor and not domestic products.137 The addition of Burns shifted power 
dynamics by affording the company greater cooperation, capital, and resources needed to 
exercise influence in their agreement with C.E.V. along with their growing inter-
provincial operations. Despite reinforcing their alliance, they were unable to take control 
of the Windsor-Detroit market because of regional and transnational competition which 
forced Low’s Group to merge with other exporters and vertically structured companies to 
create new enterprises. Therefore, shifting the purpose of coordinating co-offending 
multiplex partnerships from price-cutting to taking control of the market, to using the 
predatory pricing strategy, to stabilizing the market, and finally, produce greater profits. 
     Pooling their interests in May 1926, Low’s Group merged with the Harold Massey 
Group and later the Nathanson group to form the Vancouver Forwarding Company or 
V.F.C. to ship domestic and international liquor to the United States.138 While the 
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company operated from C.P.R. dock alongside Carling and their subsidiary Low’s Group, 
V.F.C. was not a new enterprise and existed prior to its incorporation under Low and 
Massey as a fruit shipping company.139 Unlike Low’s previous enterprises, the V.F.C. did 
not purchase liquor, rather as a forwarding company products were purchased exclusively 
by Mr. C.A. or F. Savard and his later alias B. Syringe through one of the three 
participating export companies and at the buyer’s direction sent to a local dock where the 
products were forwarded to Detroit.140 Within their alliance, each export company 
forwarded affiliated products from pre-existing partnerships. Hence Low’s Group 
forwarded Consolidated Exporters of Vancouver, Nathanson the Atlas Shipping 
Company, and Massey the Kennedy Company.141 As a result, Low initially established a 
single-stranded tie with the Massey Group which was reinforced following the creation of 
the V.F.C. While under the forwarding company he produced a single-stranded tie with 
the Nathanson Group, and strengthened his multiplex ties with the Consolidated 
Exporters of Vancouver, Charles Burns, Marco Leon, and Samuel Low.142 Because each 
group acted as sub-agents to the other Low established single-stranded ties with Joseph 
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Kennedy and the Atlas Shipping Company; therefore, reinforcing his West Coast 
interests and extending his business investments to the East Coast respectively.143  
     Within the V.F.C., because two of the three participating exporters held prior 
partnerships, the company acted as a “complex joint venture” in which co-offending to 
stabilize inter-provincial price-cutting became attainable through cooperation to end local 
rivalries between the Low and Massey Groups, this coordination of interests allowed all 
participants to profit from their enterprises by selling exclusively to one purchaser.144 
Illustrated in the company’s profits and subsequent division, on average the V.F.C. 
earned $200,000 to $300,000 per month; of the revenue earned Low’s Group received 
55%, Nathanson 45%, and Massey the final third.145 Based on revenue distribution, the 
participating partners were not equal. Employing the same strategy to leverage power at 
the Vancouver Sittings, Low’s Group used their company’s multiplex ties to form the 
primary interests in the company, while one of the leading shareholders was Samuel 
Low.146 Therefore, Low’s Group used familial, personal, and business ties to maximize 
profit intake and exert influence over the company’s decision-making process. However, 
because the V.F.C. was formed as a risk-based venture it was wracked with infighting 
between participants and suffered from chronic undervaluation of products during the 
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export process.147 To combat tensions, in October 1926, participants disbanded the 
original V.F.C. and began operating under other names including the Vancouver 
Forwarding and Shipping Company Limited and the Wayne Products Company.148 
     Following its second re-organization, the Vancouver Forwarding and Shipping 
Company Limited or V.F.S.C. acted as both a forwarding company and a warehouse.149 
Because the company represented the same exporters, all elite participants in Low’s 
network acquired multiplex ties. As a conduit to re-invest their co-offending business 
practices, the company acted as a common carrier for the Wayne Products Company 
shielding it from increasing local and regional legal proceedings against the warehousing 
of liquor and beer.150 The second company created as a result of internal tensions in the 
V.F.C. was the Wayne Products Company or W.P.C. which consisted of the same three 
groups of exporters who turned in their V.F.C. stocks and used their capital to adjust their 
partnership agreement.151  
     The W.P.C. operated between November 5th, 1926 and April 30th, 1927 and was 
employed to purchase liquor for the V.F.S.C. based on a small commission and continued 
to use the same import companies. Reinforcing their multiplex ties, the W.P.C. 
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financially benefited all co-offending participants; however, the new enterprise was not a 
joint stock company, instead it was a partnership which operated out of the C.P.R. dock 
and divided profits monthly on the same basis as the original V.F.C.152 On average the 
company made between $20,000 to $25,000 per month with the highest at $50,000. Over 
the course of its operation, $1,693,000 was moved through the account with cheques 
signed by two of the following men: Harry Low, Samuel Low, Maurice Nathanson, 
Sidney Nathanson, John Massey, and Harold Massey.153 By assigning his brother as 
power of attorney, Low used familial trust to consolidate control over the W.P.C.154 
While the company suffered from chronic undervaluation and infighting like the V.F.C., 
Low’s need to maintain a horizontally coordinated supply chain outweighed efficient 
purchasing methods found in vertically structured enterprises as is illustrated in his 
following endeavour: the Cuban Export Company.155 
     For six weeks following April 27th 1926, the Cuban Export Company or C.E.C. was 
composed of the same exporters, operated as a non-incorporated enterprise, and was used 
to forward $240,000 worth of products from the Distillers Corporation or D.C. of 
Montreal through the W.P.C. to Detroit.156 Sam and Harry Bronfman opened the 
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Montreal based distillery in 1924. As prolific liquor manufacturers, the Bronfman 
brothers operated numerous companies during prohibition of which the Distillers 
Corporation, Dominion Distributors, and the Atlas Shipping Company were their primary 
enterprises.157 Like Low, the Bronfman brothers invested in creating an inter-provincial 
import and export network. Successfully handling their products allowed Low’s Group to 
shift from acting as a sub-agent under the Nathanson Group to forming a strategic 
alliance with the Bronfman interests as formal agents for the Distillers Corporation in 
August 1926.158 With their formal partnership Low’s Group established a single-stranded 
tie which provided access to the company’s popular products, larger American markets, 
and reinforced their access to the Canadian East Coast and European market. Of the 
Bronfman associated companies on the East Coast which had access to the international 
market, Low, Leon, and Burns reinvested their partnership to buy out the Franco-
Canadian Import Company for the purpose of price-cutting imported European liquors in 
the Windsor-Detroit market in 1926. 
     Originally incorporated on June 16th 1923 in Halifax, Nova Scotia the Franco-
Canadian Import Company or F.C.I.C. acted as a joint operation employed by foreign 
manufacturers to forward their liquor and beer to Canada.159 The enterprise also blended 
 
157 Royal Commission of Customs and Excise, Volume I, Interim Report No. 10, 51-56. Other companies 
under their control included the Canada Drug Company, Yorkton Distributors, Gainsborough Liquor 
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Schneider, Iced, 193, 200-205. 
159 Royal Commission of Customs and Excise, Volume I, Interim Report No. 10, 64-65.; “Public Hearings,” 
Royal Commission of Inquiry into the Customs and Excise Department, 1926-1927, RG 33-88, Volume 19, 
Halifax Part IV, June 30th, 1927, Archives/Collections and Fonds, Library and Archives Canada, Ottawa, 
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and rebottled imported products and ran a bonded warehouse at 57 Upper Water Street, 
Halifax. Commencing operations under Harry Rabinovitch as manager and owner, and an 
agent for several Bronfman companies, the F.C.I.C. conducted most of its business 
between March 1924 and June 1925.160 
     Changing hands four times, Low, Leon, and Burns independently reinvested their 
multiplex ties in a predatory purchase to buy out the F.C.I.C. and establish themselves as 
directors in December 1926.161 During the same month, the company’s former President 
Mr. John Mitchel sold Low, Leon, and Burns his stock on the condition “that it was 
incumbent upon the company getting permission to accept their duty-paid goods which 
were in the ware house.”162 However, the deal did not go through. As a result, they could 
only sell the goods held in the warehouse upon purchase for a 15% commission plus 
shipping costs and were to reimburse Mr. Mitchell when the products sold.163 
Incorporating the new company as the Maritime Import and Shipping Company of 
Halifax, it was “not a live company,” and operations declined rapidly.164 Despite 
functioning at a lower capacity under Low, Leon, and Burns, the trio used the company to 
force the Bronfman’s Atlas Shipping Company to price-cut their imported European 
liquor by flooding Windsor-Detroit’s regional and transnational market with European 
 
160 Royal Commission of Customs and Excise, Volume I, Interim Report, 50-56, 64-65.; “Public Hearings,” 
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liquor and wine.165 Although Low’s Group held a multiplex partnership with the 
Nathanson Group, it did not stop Carling’s subsidiary from leveraging their power to take 
control of lucrative domestic and European products in the Windsor-Detroit market as is 
demonstrated in their reinvestment in two Bronfman associated companies.  
     In the fall of 1926, Low’s Group changed its name to the Western Exporters Company 
and reinvested their initial partnership with the Bronfman interests acquiring a multiplex 
tie to handle their products through the Erie Transit Company or E.T.C., a Carling export 
subsidiary.166 Using their familial bond, Low strategically consolidated control over 
Bronfman products by positioning his brother as President, himself as an official, and 
Carling employee Walter Hardie as secretary. The E.T.C. was created alongside the 
W.P.C. and was also used to legally protect liquor shipments for the Distillers 
Corporation and Joseph E. Seagram & Sons. While E.T.C. closed its operations between 
February and March 1927, as a transit company it was associated with local warehouses 
and sold products to anyone willing to purchase.167 Of the companies which bought from 
Erie, Samuel Low was also connected to the Seagram’s Distilling Agency or S.D.A.  
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     During the same fiscal year, the S.D.A. was created as an export subsidiary which 
operated from the same office as the E.T.C., used the C.P.R. dock, and American 
consignee. Within the enterprise itself, Samuel Low acted as vice-president and Walter 
Hardie kept the company’s books.168 Therefore, both men held multiplex ties which 
connected Carling and its export subsidiaries with the Bronfman and Seagram interests to 
co-offend within the Windsor-Detroit market by facilitating product flow to intended 
markets. Following the creation of the Bermuda Export Company, the E.T.C. and S.D.A. 
used the export combine’s docks to ship products.169 The Bermuda Export Company was 
created as a coordinated response by regional brewers against W.M. Egan’s rat fund and 
the 1924 Anti-Smuggling treaty between the U.S. and Canada. 
     Prohibition in the Windsor-Detroit region not only benefitted brewers, distillers, and 
exporters but customs agents as well. The Department of Customs and Excise at the port 
of Windsor and its subports acted as a key conduit in Low’s network tying the illicit 
economy to legitimate society through their agent’s systemic participation and acceptance 
of regularized payments to facilitate the exportation of alcohol to the U.S.170 W.M. Egan 
was one of the department’s most prolific solicitors to participate in these practices. In 
1923 he created a “‘rat fund’” to “normalize” payments from local and regional 
breweries, distilleries, and export firms for “favourable treatment and immunity” from 
 
168 “Public Hearings,” Royal Commission of Customs and Excise, Volume 14, Windsor Part VII, 16,301.; 
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possible government interference.171  The agreement initially benefitted both Egan (who 
not only received additional income but used the money to establish an economic stake of 
500 common and preferred shares in the Bixel Brewing and Malting Company) and 
participating suppliers. Of which the companies involved were able to moderate 
competition by coordinating their activities through Egan to access U.S. markets beyond 
Detroit with minimized risk.172 Because brewers and distillers destroyed and/or did not 
disclose payments in their records only five companies were known participants, of 
which included Carling Brewery. Therefore, both customs agents and vertically 
structured companies co-offended to limit competition by regularizing payoffs to 
coordinate their activities to export uninhibited.173 However, their ability to legally export 
large volumes of product was limited by the 1924 Anti-Smuggling Treaty. As a result, 
regional breweries held multiple conferences in their attempt to establish an agreement to 
circumvent the legislation. Coordinating their activities horizontally to maintain supply 
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and demand to major markets, their cooperation spawned three separate agreements all of 
which fell through prior to the creation of the Bermuda Export Company.174  
     Incorporated in Hamilton, Bermuda the Bermuda Export Company or B.E.C. 
commenced operations on Thursday July 15th, 1926 as an export combine used 
exclusively to ship beer for the following eleven Ontario breweries: 
The British-American Brewery 
Bixel Brewing and Malting Company Limited 
Carling Export and Malting Company Limited 
Cosgrave Export Brewery Limited 
The Cronmiller and White Brewing and Malting Company Limited 
The Kuntz Brewery Limited 
The Hamilton Brewing Association Limited 
John Labatt Limited 
O’Keefe Brewery Limited 
Taylor and Bate Limited 
Walkerville Brewery Limited175 
 
The combine did not monopolize the region’s market, rather the company co-offended by 
implementing a fixed price system in which “[e]ach brewer paid the company a set figure 
on each quantity of beer” to circumvent government legislation, end price cutting, and 
competition to stabilize the Windsor-Detroit market.176 A product of the Brewers 
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Association or Export Brewers Association, the B.E.C., acted as a forwarding agent 
based on their internal agreements and by-laws produced in Toronto for the breweries. 
The directors of each brewery acted as representatives on the B.E.C.’s board and in 
pooling their resources the company’s export network reached both regional and 
transnational markets in Detroit and Cleveland, the American Midwest, and the Atlantic 
Coast.177 Within the operation’s structure, Harry Low acquired two key positions, 
therefore, producing a multiplex tie which enforced his control over the enterprise. 
     Low was named a director and represented the Carling Export Brewing & Malting 
Company Limited.178 He also operated Bermuda’s docks at LaSalle, Riverside, 
Kingsville, and Amherstburg.179 Using these positions, Low controlled and manipulated 
product prices, banking information, and product movement. Therefore, tying the B.E.C. 
and the illicit economy to legitimate society through a legal institution. To consolidate 
B.E.C.’s legitimate and semi-licit interests, Low regularly bribed customs officers like 
Joseph U. Piche and maintained horizontal relationships with smaller companies and 
docks.180 Of which, the strongest multiplex relationships produced were with O. Paquette 
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or Dominion Exporters, the Mexico Export Company, and Hoffman & Dunford. Each 
export company maintained complex alliances with Low and/or his brother Samuel, held 
contracts with Carling, purchased from at least one of the brewery’s export subsidiaries, 
including Bermuda, and in the case of the Mexico Export Company shared the same 
consignee – Savard.181 Through Low’s strategic multiplex partnerships he became one of, 
if not the region’s largest liquor and beer exporter. 
     The peak of Low’s operations occurred between 1926-1928 and is traditionally 
described as “virtually control[ing] the movement of liquor on the waterfront in Detroit 
and Windsor.”182 While Low held significant sway within the Windsor-Detroit market, 
the above characterization oversimplifies the relationship between interventionist 
legislation, overlapping partnerships, the regional and transnational market structure, and 
illegal flows. Despite record high profits amounting to approximately $470,000 which 
afforded the Low family with significant financial and social mobility, the companies 
within his network were wracked with infighting from product undervaluation.183 
However, it was not internal strife but the actions taken by the federal government to 
seize control of the lucrative liquor and beer export industry by investigating the deviant 
 
Romanoff), Gordon Reaume’s No. 3 dock (or Rheaume), and LaSalle’s Romeo dock, the Atlantic Export 
Company, the Martin’s dock, Labadie and Girard. Regional included Odey’s dock and La Porte’s dock (Port 
Lambton), Dupuis’ dock (Sombra), Thibaudeau’s dock (Sarnia), and Eaman’s dock (Courtwright). 
181 Royal Commission of Customs and Excise, Volume I, Interim Report No. 10, 58-60.; “Public Hearings,” 
Royal Commission of Inquiry into the Customs and Excise Department, 1926-1927, RG 33-88, Volume 13, 
Windsor Part II, April 22nd, 1927, 15,498-499.; “Public Hearings,” Royal Commission of Customs and Excise, 
Volume 13, Windsor Part III, 15,552-15,568.; “Public Hearings,” Royal Commission of Inquiry into the 
Customs and Excise Department, 1926-1927, RG 33-88, Volume 14, Windsor Part VI, April 28th, 1927, 
16,122-16,123, 16,160-16,163.; 
 “Public Hearings,” Royal Commission of Customs and Excise, Volume 14, Windsor Part VIII, 16,539.; 
“Public Hearings,” Royal Commission of Customs and Excise, Volume 15, Hamilton Part IV, 17,755-761. 
182 Gervais, The Rumrunners, 97.  
183 “Public Hearings,” Royal Commission of Customs and Excise, Volume 15, Hamilton Part IV, 17,694-
17,698, 17,705.; “Estimate Profits of Liquor Dealers,” The Border Cities Star, June 8th, 1927. 
 48 
 
business practices employed by brewers, distillers, and their subsidiaries under the 1926-
1927 Royal Commission of Customs and Excise which dismantled Low’s network. 
 
CHAPTER THREE: 
THE CURIOUS CASE OF MR. SAVARD 
 
     On February 5th, 1926 the House of Commons appointed a nine-member committee to 
investigate the Department of Customs and Excise and the  
     alleged serious losses to the public treasury because of inefficiency or corruption on  
     the part of officers of the Department and others,…and have regard to all matters  
     affecting the prevention of smuggling, the prosecution of offenders, the seizure,  
     storage and disposal of smuggled goods or goods seized for purposes of excise or  
     other taxes, the appraisal of goods for revenue purposes,…and the necessity of  
     safeguarding the public revenue and the public treasury.184 
 
Four months later on June 29th, 1926 the House of Commons made an addendum to 
include the following: 
     Since the inquiry indicates that the smuggling evils are so extensive and their  
     ramifications so far reaching that only a portion of the illegal practices have been  
     brought to light, your Committee recommends the appointment of a judicial  
     Commission with full powers to continue and complete investigating the  
     administration of the Department of Customs and Excise and to prosecute all  
     offenders.185 
 
 
184 Royal Commission of Inquiry into the Customs and Excise Department, 1926-1927, RG 33-88, Volume 1, 
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Between July 20th, 1926 and January 14th, 1927 a series of justices were appointed to 
each province for the purpose of completing the investigation.186 In Ontario, the 
Honourable William Henry Wright, a Supreme Court Justice, was appointed 
Commissioner for the province, while Mr. R.L. Calder, K.C., and the Honourable N.W. 
Rowell, K.C., were appointed by the Council as senior counsel. The law firm Clarkson, 
Gordon, and Dilworth were appointed to work under Mr. A.E. Nash as auditors to 
investigate the practices of Canadian distilleries and breweries.187 The Commission 
commenced in British Columbia on November 17th, 1926 and moved east across the 
country, finishing on September 14th, 1927 after investigating 106 distilleries and 
breweries, 99 export firms, and 207 varying commercial activities. Using multiplexity 
against brewers, distillers, and their import and export subsidiaries the Commission 
subpoenaed executives, employees, and associated businesses, and compelled them to 
testify against each other under oath. From their efforts auditors used testimonials and 
internal documents to break apart their horizontally structured networks to reveal severe 
irregularities in their vertical company practices resulting in a great loss of revenue to the 
Dominion.188 Of the major ports examined in the province, the Commission determined 
that Windsor presented complex and varying problems.189 
     Described as “abnormal” the Commission found that Windsor experienced a “rapid 
growth in the liquor export trade” following the onset of Temperance and Volstead. By 
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1926 approximately 61% of Canadian liquor exports passed through the port of Windsor 
and its outports at Belle River, Sandwich, and Walkerville.190 The Commission’s audit of 
southwestern Ontario brewers, distillers, and their semi-licit enterprises disclosed: 
     that at no time since 1923 ha[d] the Customs law and regulations in reference to the  
     export of liquors, at the port of Windsor, or its sub-ports, been carried out and while  
     there have been repeated infraction of the Customs law by the parties concerned, in  
     the export of liquor, prosecutions were not instituted for these infractions.191 
 
And Harry Low was at the centre of their investigation.  
     Low’s activities were described by the Commission as “personal and through various 
organizations,” and was noted to be one of “the most active dealers” in the region.192 For 
seven years his extensive partnerships effectively concealed his network’s most illegal 
practices. Based on their audit, the Commission found that deviant practices were 
implemented and institutionalized within Carling and carried over to the company’s 
subsidiaries and affiliated businesses as a means to circumvent legislation. Of their 
“routine” business practices auditors demonstrated that all of Low’s companies and their 
employees actively bribed customs and railway officers, secured product immunity using 
customs entries, used unlicensed export houses, utilized fraudulent invoices to short-
circuit and transfer liquor and beer, participated in predatory pricing methods like 
undervaluation, employed banks to conduct unlawful schemes such as money laundering, 
and profited from sales and tax evasion.193 However, auditors struggled to find: 
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     direct evidence that the company had authorized any of its officials or employees to  
     do these illegal acts, yet the whole circumstances lead to the irresistible conclusion  
     that as the company was profiting from these fraudulent devices, some of the officials  
     of the company must have had knowledge of the same and connived therein and the  
     management should be held responsible for such operations.194  
 
On one hand, the Commission’s summary and recommendations for Carling Brewery 
were reluctant to identify or charge management. The other, testimonials and physical 
evidence of the above illegal practices implicated company executives, mid-level 
employees, and their relationships with other enterprises and American purchasers.195 Of 
Low’s partnerships, prosecutors sought to gain testimony from C.A. or F. Savard initially 
for the purpose of making him pay income tax for purchasing Canadian beer and 
liquor.196 However, during the hearings it became clear that Low’s companies could not 
be separated from the Detroit purchaser.  
 
     Enlisting the help of Harry Low and Charles Burns as intermediaries, the Commission 
attempted to convince Savard to present himself before the public hearings in Windsor.197 
Initially refusing to show, C.A. Savard appeared before the Commission on May 2nd, 
1927 at Windsor Court. Represented by Mr. Furlong, Savard stated that he carried on his 
business out of LaSalle as a purchaser and bought from Harold Massey, Joseph Kennedy, 
B.C. Distilleries, Gooderham & Worts, and Dominion Distilleries and denied handling 
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Consolidated Exporters and Atlas Shipping Company.198 During the hearing, Savard 
alleged that his name had been used without his authority by regional brewers and 
distillers to freely export their products. With the accusation it became apparent to 
auditors that the C.A. Savard who presented themselves at the hearings was not the one 
used by Harry Low.199 While auditors continued their search during the hearing process 
to locate Savard at provided addresses in Detroit, Cleveland, and St. Thomas they 
struggled to corroborate witness accounts, and to provide written or signed documents by 
the purchaser. Each attempt made by the Commission to find Savard led to a dead end.200 
Despite their efforts, auditors were unable to locate the elusive purchaser.  
     Detroit’s famous inebriated liquor dealer, C.A. or F. Savard was one of the most 
prominent figures investigated by both the Canadian and U.S. governments for crimes 
committed under the Ontario Temperance Act and Volstead. While the Royal 
Commission of Customs and Excise did not prosecute Savard, he was later indicted in 
Buffalo, New York on November 2nd, 1928 for his role in the multi-company “conspiracy 
to pass liquor-laden freight cars from the Dominion into” the United States.201 Like the 
1927 Windsor public hearings, Savard did not show, and he never would, because he was 
not a participant, partner, or even a real person, Savard was a business practice.202 
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     On December 5th, 1928 The Border Cities Star revealed in “Dorn Asks Rum Pact 
With Canada Revised,” that Savard was a fictitious name employed by Carling to 
legitimize their liquor and beer shipments under Canadian law as a means to circumvent 
W.E. Gundy’s 1921 ruling that U.S. citizens who purchased Canadian alcohol could not 
be present in Ontario during negotiations, per the Ontario Temperance Act.203 Initially 
using the pseudonym “Grandi,” “Savard” was later chosen as a common French surname 
in the region; however, other fictitious names adopted by Low’s companies included 
“C.B. Grandy,” “C.D. Grande,” “Mr. Shearer,” “P. Druxinsky,” “F. Druzinski,” or 
“Druzinsky,” and “B. Syringe.”204 Based on the conclusions made by the Commission, 
Carling Brewery and their export subsidiaries used the above fictitious names to illegally 
conduct transactions on Canadian soil for their real American and Canadian purchasers. 
If the purchaser was an American, products were paid for in Canada, delivered in 
country, and then exported. While products bought by Canadians were short-circuited or 
transferred to another dock where the goods lost their names and became amalgamated 
with other stock.205 Therefore, both vertical and horizontal enterprises and their 
respective employees worked together, conspiring to defraud the Canadian government 
of revenue.206  
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     As a business practice, the use of fictitious names was implemented by Carling 
approximately one month after the brewery’s first beer production for export on or about 
May 12th, 1924 and was actively used until March 26th, 1928. This period corresponds to 
deposits made by John Allen Kennedy to the Carling Company account at Windsor’s 
Dominion Bank on behalf of any of the two following signatories: Harry Low, Marco 
Leon, and Charles Burns.207 Within the company’s overlapping structures, it was not 
“Savard” but his representative John Allen Kennedy who operated at the most dangerous 
point in Low’s network, acting as the intermediary with the real purchasers – Detroit’s 
organized crime networks. Therefore, executives conspired to employ Kennedy within 
multiple legitimate company roles as representative, warehouse manager, and bookkeeper 
to conceal his purpose within their network. A liability, Kennedy was murdered in 
Monroe County, Michigan in 1928.208 While officials were never able to physically 
connect Low as orchestrator, they used incidental offences to unravel his network 
following the conclusion of the Commission in 1927.209 Because fictitious names grew in 
tandem with Low’s network they were initially used to circumvent interventionist 
legislation; however, as they became institutionalized within Carling’s vertical structure 
they were carried over to their horizontal enterprises where they cultivated multiplex 
partnerships via the conspiracy to commit fraud. In turn, these offences intersected with 
and informed the network’s co-offending business practice of price-cutting to conduct 
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money laundering and tax evasion for personal and corporate gain as is demonstrated in 
their banking transactions. 
     Between Carling’s reorganization in October 1923 to September 30th, 1926 the 
Commission initially found that the brewery owed the government $308,778.50 in sales 
and gallonage tax, taking into account 15% to 20% wastage; however, these figures 
excluded gallonage tax for their 2 1/2 % beer and the 75 cents collected by the Bermuda 
Export Company.210 Because Charles Burns ran the brewery’s main bank accounts, while 
Harry Low operated the export docks and their respective accounts, auditors determined 
that the executives used fictitious names to create and maintain an elaborate money 
laundering and tax evasion scheme.211 
     When shipping products Low’s companies employed an informal export insurance 
which was the difference between the alleged price paid and the actual price paid by the 
“purchaser,” and was carried out using fraudulent invoices and legitimate bank 
accounts.212 Based on the forensic audit carried out by the Commission 
     the Carling Company carried to the credit of their sales account for the purpose of  
     computing sales tax, only $1.75 per carton, both prior and subsequent to the formation  
     of the Bermuda Export Company Ltd. The purchase price received was substantially  
     in excess of this amount. At the formation of the Bermuda Export Company the  
     difference between $2.50 per carton [or 75 cents] received by the Carling Company  
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     and $3.25 per carton, less expense, collected by the Bermuda Export Company, was  
     received by Burns, Low and Leon, the principal stock-holders of the Carling  
     Company, and this amount did not pass through the books of the Carling Company,  
     the result being to reduce the profits of the Company for the purpose of income tax  
     and to reduce the sales of the company for the purpose of the sales tax.213 
 
Withheld money was transferred to one of several bank accounts at the Dominion Bank 
of Windsor. Implemented in the fiscal year 1924-1925, Carling began crediting excess 
money from their “purchaser” to their “Insurance of Delivery at Point of Final 
Destination” account. By charging money to the account as “insurance” Carling paid 
“Savard’s men.” 214 Of which, payees included Mr. Kennedy, as well as dock workers 
and truck drivers. The period in which the account was opened also coincided with the 
time period in which Carling stopped declaring sales and gallonage tax. By June 30th, 
1925 the company had neglected to pay approximately $151,175.26 in taxes.215 In the 
same year Carling created a formal account in which money was credited to their “Export 
Insurance Account” or E.I.A., using “Grandi” and later “Savard” as “purchasers.”216 
Based on the Commission’s findings, Charles Burns and Harry Low were the statement 
recipients of the account.217  
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     Operating the E.I.A. account, Charles Burns dictated how orders were made. A 
Carling accountant would make an order to the purchaser through Burns who told them 
the amount, and how to write the order. This included indicating how many B-13’s were 
issued to the purchaser in the care of Mr. Kennedy at the C.P.R. dock.218 Second, he 
directed how and when money was to be transferred. For example, when transitioning 
between purchasers, bad debt incurred under Grandi was put in Savard’s name at the 
behest of Burns.219 In regard to Low’s participation, multiple cheques were found in his 
name that were crossed out and re-written as “Savard,” and were deposited in a 
secondary account, the “Savard, re expenses Windsor dock.”220 The account itself was 
allegedly used for drafts, cheques and transfers; however, the Commission discovered 
other accounts which were used for similar purposes. These included the “F. Savard, 
advances,” and “F. Savard sales,” as well as other personal accounts or “C. Burns’ Export 
Fund,” and American consignee representative accounts like the “The Windsor 
Investment Account.”221 Based on how the bank accounts were set up, all participating 
executives and select high-ranking employees were Savard. For example, if Low was not 
present his brother Samuel held power of attorney to sign on behalf of his brother.222 
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Individually, Low’s bank activity was traced through remittances and money transfers to 
other Savard accounts. 
     Money was primarily remitted by transferring it “from the Dominion Bank in Windsor 
to the Dominion Bank in London.”223 However, finances were also moved to four local 
and regional Savard accounts which included the Windsor, Detroit, Point Edward, and 
Port Stanley accounts and were “in care” of Low, Hall, and Segal. These accounts were 
merged on October 30th, 1926 under “The Savard Commission Account” which was 
created to funnel the profits from the four individual accounts into one main account.224 
While officially used for “Savard,” it was actually employed by Carling to settle their 
expenses, including bad debts and losses.225 When employed within their network, 
fictitious names were used to cultivate multiplexity by intersecting with each of Low’s 
subsidiary companies and their respective partnerships.  
     Because participants were dependent on each other for success, they had to trust Low 
to facilitate export and transportation to intended markets using illegal methods.226 By 
cooperating and coordinating their activities, those who held multiplex ties co-offended 
by spreading financial and personal risk among small-scale export ventures. As 
demonstrated in their reinvested partnerships, these horizontally structured enterprises 
were not only used to move large volumes of products but money to major ports 
including Windsor, Ontario, Vancouver and Victoria, British Columbia, and Halifax, 
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Nova Scotia where brewers and distillers laundered money to commit tax evasion.227 This 
was made possible because Carling’s primary export subsidiaries were shell companies.     
     Low’s Group or the Western Exporters Company, Vancouver Forwarding Company 
and its affiliated enterprises, the Franco-Canadian Import Company, the Bermuda Export 
Company, the Erie Transit Company, the Seagram Distilling Agency, and Carling Export 
or the Carling Agency operated from the same building(s), dock(s), and employed the 
same people and were “so entirely interlocked that it [was] practically impossible to 
distinguish one from the other.”228 Officially these companies had bank accounts which 
featured significant overlapping transactions, however, they existed only on paper and 
were used to protect Carling’s external partnerships, products, and financial assets from 
government interference. While the Franco-Canadian Import Company and Bermuda 
Export Company served a legitimate purpose to transport and export liquor and beer 
respectively, both were shell companies. This is because under the control of Low, Leon, 
and Burns the F.C.I.C. operated as an inactive enterprise, while the B.E.C. was created in 
a tax haven to avoid government regulations and taxation.229 Of the practices instituted 
within their vertical structure, Carling’s shell companies were directed by executives and 
high-ranking employees who used these “enterprises” at the behest of fictitious 
purchasers to mimic the legal transportation and export of liquor and beer. Therefore, the 
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Windsor-Detroit border did not function within a static reciprocal relationship, instead the 
illicit economy was integrated into legitimate society by organizational actors and their 
respective enterprises which conducted transborder arrangements along a horizontal 
structure. Within Low’s network participants employed local and state legal asymmetries 
to cultivate and maintain regional and inter-provincial multiplex partnerships for the 
purpose of co-offending to conceal and secure illegal transactions made at each point in 
the supply chain to produce a semi-stable market.  
     Because “law and crime emerge from historical and ongoing struggles over 
legitimacy, in the course of which powerful groups succeed in delegitimizing and 
criminalizing certain practices” Low’s network provides new insight onto the 
contestation of power between the emerging Canadian state and non-state actors to define 
and regulate the movement of goods across a border and broader borderland during the 
first third of the 20th century.230 As an operational mechanism multiplexity generated a 
complex inter-provincial network of brewers, distillers, import and export subsidiaries 
which relied on overlapping familial and business relationships to facilitate the 
movement of goods and services to intended markets.231 Since these partnerships did not 
exist within a strict hierarchy, allowed individuals like Low to employ co-offending 
business practices which required the participation of legitimate persons to conspire to 
commit fraud for corporate and personal gain.232 While these relationships integrated 
organized crime into legitimate society by cultivating reciprocity and trust as a means to 
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manipulate and attempt to control product prices, they however, did not create a 
monopolistic market. Instead multiplex partnerships and co-offending practices not only 
rendered Low’s network and business operations visible but vulnerable to increasing 
government regulation within the Windsor-Detroit borderland.233  
 
CHAPTER FOUR: 
IT’S ALE DOWNHILL FROM HERE 
 
     Despite the overwhelming physical and circumstantial evidence levelled against 
Carling Brewery, the Canadian government did not prosecute the company’s executives, 
rather the Commission’s recommendations forced the government to implement four 
pieces of interventionist legislation which re-organized and expanded the role of the 
customs department. Designed to increase legislative control along the Canada-U.S. 
border, the minister was granted the right to revoke distillers’ and brewers’ licenses for 
participating in unlawful business practices. It is within this context in which the 
government launched a series of criminal investigations against producers and exporters 
following the 1927 repeal of the Ontario Temperance Act.234   
     In 1928, the federal government charged Carling Brewery with $121,000 in gallonage 
and sales tax evasion for the approximate “$1,500,000 worth of Carling beer [which] 
flowed across the border, through the channel of the Bermuda Export Company between 
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July 15 1926 and April 30 1927.”235 Despite the charge, Low, Leon, and Burns reinvested 
their ties for the last time in an attempt to diversify their business activities. Of their 
investments, the trio entered the Toronto and Windsor real estate market, opened the 
LL&B Distilleries, and financed the creation of the Dominion Square building in 
Montreal. However, a second investigation was opened in 1929, in which the federal 
government alleged that the brewery owed the national revenue department $421,000 in 
taxes for short-circuiting their products back into Canada between April 1st, 1924 and 
May 1st, 1927.236 The brewery was ultimately convicted and forced to pay reparations to 
the government. Their decline was coupled with the closure of the Windsor export docks 
following the implementation of the 1930 Export Act which made “it illegal for 
Canadians to ship alcoholic beverages to countries that banned their sale.”237 Financially 
crippled, Carling Brewery was sold at a loss to E.P. Taylor’s Canadian Brewers Ltd. in 
the same year.238 While the Export Act successfully curtailed the actions of large-scale 
syndicates, small-scale operations flourished until the U.S. repealed prohibition in 1933 
under the Twenty-First Amendment. However, because the American liquor and beer 
industry was not equipped to supply the country’s market, the U.S. government re-
opened the border to Canadian beer and liquor imports.239  
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     While the Canadian government eliminated competitors to take control of the liquor 
and beer industry, by the mid-century their continued use of interventionist legislation to 
govern the border solidified the presence and acceptance of the illicit economy by 
residents as a form of licit income.240 Of which Harry Low was among the former rum-
runners who pursued a career in the illicit economy.   
     Official charges against Low did not materialize until 1931 when he was arraigned for 
bribing an R.C.M.P. officer.241 While the charge was dropped in 1932, Low faced U.S. 
extradition for bribery. Avoiding deportation, in 1934 Low moved to Detroit, where he 
acted as president of the Trenton Valley Distillers. Later he returned to Canada where he 
started the Tecumseh-based, Old Comrades Brewery. However, he continued to partake 
in poor investments, and illegal business and personal financial practices including tax 
evasion. In 1939, he was “faced with a [U.S.] federal indictment charging him and a vice-
president of Trenton Valley with stock swindling.”242 Evading law enforcement, Low 
returned to Canada, where he was faced with repeated extradition charges by both 
countries. To avoid deportation, Low lived between the province of Quebec, Windsor and 
Detroit until his death in August 1955 at Hotel Dieu, Windsor, Ontario.243 
     Prohibition demonstrates how Canada and the U.S. legislatively sought to regulate the 
social behavior of their respective citizens during the early 20th century. It also illustrates 
the ways in which increasing state control spawned the creation and integration of large-
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scale organized crime syndicates into legitimate society.244 With the sustained demand 
for alcohol, North American syndicates became wealthier, better organized, and more 
violent than their predecessors. In other words, prohibition modernized organized 
crime.245 However, in the Windsor-Detroit borderland, research on this transformative 
period has relied on the perspective of the border as a binary, as well as the charismatic 
personalities of individual bootleggers to address their business activities, and by 
extension their criminal networks.246 By repositioning research within the chaotic and 
complex business and social worlds of brewers, distillers, and exporters offers the 
potential to produce greater information and analysis on other overlooked perspectives. 
This includes the role of corporate, government, and independent mediators who 
leveraged their knowledge of transborder flows to facilitate the transportation and export 
of alcohol.247 From their participation, mediators are the “missing link” which connects 
state power, illegal flows, and transborder arrangements to the evolution organized 
crime.248 
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HARRY LOW’S ORGANIZED CRIME NETWORK, 1920-1923 
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HARRY LOW’S ORGANIZED CRIME NETWORK, 1923-1925 
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HARRY LOW’S ORGANIZED CRIME NETWORK, 1925-1926 
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HARRY LOW’S ORGANIZED CRIME NETWORK, 1926-1927 
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